We’ve got Russia all wrong.

Both Republicans and Democrats misunderstand Russia.

Using Syria as an example, neither knows how to respond to Russia. In 2012–13, the Assad regime used chemical weapons against its people. Obama had said this crossed a line, presumably meaning military response would follow. A chess game unfolded. Secretary of State Kerry said if Assad turned over all chemical weapons to the international community, a military strike could be averted. This was intended as much to shore up support in the US and Europe as influence Assad.

Russia, however, arranged for Syria to “declare” its chemical weapons stockpiles, and said they would transport it out of the country (and got China to assist.) It took about 15 months for all “reported” chemicals to get removed, and get destroyed on a US ship off Italy. After a drop-off in chemical attacks, reports of surfaced in August 2016 of new ones by Assad.

Politics aside, Syria’s capacity to use chemical weapons was vastly degraded by the Russian arrangement. But in early 2017 Syria used sarin gas against opponents in Idlib. The Trump administration hit a Syrian air base with cruise missles. This would have been the response of Democrats and other Republicans as well. At this point, Russia responded by blocking condemnation of Syria, preventing UN inspections. The US said it would hold Russia responsible for future chemical attacks in Syria.

In 2018 Syria used chemical bombs repeatedly. Russia continued to block legitimate inspections. The US, France and UK struck chemical weapons sites with missles. Russia bristled.

Russia intervened in 2013 because it saw an opportunity. Syria had vast amounts of chemical weapons. It wasn’t feasible to use them on an industrial scale, like a nuclear bomb. The Russians knew that chemical weapons can be effective in limited attacks, because they undermine opponent morale. But storing so many chemical weapons allowed opposition movements to obtain some. Rather than destroy the excess secretly, Russia convinced Syria it would gain time, and offload a tremendously difficult technical problem, to get the international community to do it.

The US saw this as a win-win. With a vast supply of weapons, no “precision” strikes could seriously degrade them. The US also didn’t want them to fall into the hands of proliferators. Being in charge of destruction insured compliance.

Both Democrats and Republicans made a mistake. Republicans, in knee-jerk opposition, accused Obama of weakness because he didn’t shoot up a Syrian base. Democrats thought they solved the problem through Russia. Neither side imagined that Russia and Syria planned for different, strategic use of chemical weapons. Would an attack on Syria have improved outcomes? It would have delayed the destruction of most chemicals, perhaps ended the possibility. It might have marginally deterred further Syrian attacks, but from a basis of vastly more weapons.

But when Syria started their new strategy in 2017, the US drew a new, Russian red line. UN Ambassador Haley said Russia (and Iran) would be held responsible for future chemical attacks. Instead, the US and Europe attacked Syria.

Few want to attack Russian facilities. But we should. Russia will continue to do what it can in Syria, until Putin pays a domestic price. The US worries that dog fights between Russian and US pilots would result in mayhem. Russia does not have any fifth-generation fighters nor advanced airborne systems that can compare with the US F-22 and F-35. US military pilots have experienced from decades of war. Putin does not want to see his air force humiliated.

Russian strategy is different than US or China. Russia’s view is territorial expansion. This seems hard to fathom, for those looking at a vast country spread across 10 times zones. But history is contingent. Russia’s huge spread was a relatively recent historical action, only slightly ahead of the US expansion west. It’s the basis of much Russian identity. Russia will expand if unopposed, threaten conflict if opposed, but retreat in the face of real opposition.

One of the most anomolous, and fascinating, patterns of history concerns two facts. 1) China’s population has been so much larger than any other nation’s for thousands of years. 2) The largest part of the world’s largest continent, Euro-Asia, sits above China, and has had a much smaller population than other parts of the world, for millenia.

Russia only became a social reality in the 15th century. Ivan the Great beat Tatars to gain control of lands between Moscow and the Urals. In the 16th, Ivan the Terrible centralized power, and sent Cossacks to conquer the huge area east of the Urals, including Siberia. In 60 years small groups of Russian soldiers, with artillery, defeated nomadic tribes all the way to the Pacific. Like European settlers in the US (which occured a century later) the Russians carried disease that overwhelmed local populations. Smallpox reduced numbers by at least 50%.

In the 1700s Cossacks faced tribes who fought with stones. 90% of native groups in the far east were wiped out. Although Soviet-era historians claimed Russians did not dominate the native population as Europeans did native Americans, that’s due to paucity of Russian population. Native peoples account for perhaps 10% of the eastern Russian population currently, compared to 1.6% in the US. But in absolute numbers there are ten times more native Americans than native Russians. The total population of the eastern lands in Russia (which account for 1/3 of total Russian area) is only 6.25 million.

The Russian state and Russian society formed 500 years ago, and developed as it expanded across a huge continent, into depopulated lands. When Russians reached the northern border of China, they stopped. There was no interest in fighting wars they might lose badly.

Over the long flow of human history, China’s early state formation, and population stability, precluded its expansion into what is today east Russia. Had China not developed irrigated farming so early, it’s people may well have expanded further north. That would have blocked much of Russia’s great expansion centuries later.

History is contingent. Russia’s character, it’s approach to international relations, is a result. They expand until blocked. They bristle at being blocked, domestic politics. But blocking is needed. Putin will not go down to defeat in an internation conflict. That’s the greatest threat to him domestically. Russians want to expand. They don’t want to lose.