Frustrations #1: Missed Diplomacy

In 2008 I had a good diplomatic idea, one that could have promoted peace in the Middle East. It was levelheaded, timely, and not too costly. It involved Cyprus, a country where Muslims and Christians fight, where Ottomans then British ruled, but which in 2008 was ready for a breakthrough. A successful effort there, by Turkish and U.S. diplomats, might have generated support for efforts to address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict afterwards. Peace processes need confidence, and Cyprus could have resonated in the Middle East.

But I couldn’t convince my representatives to push the idea in the administration. This is probably typical; without contacts and networks, a citizen has little chance to influence important players. The 2008 opportunity has largely vanished, so my idea will never see the light of day. That’s frustrating.

In 2008, at the beginning of the Obama administration, the Middle East was moribund. The Arab Spring was far ahead, the Iraq War simmered fitfully, and the Palestinian-Israel peace process was dormant. The big issue was Hamas’s seizure of Gaza, which triggered a siege of this tiny area.

Today’s Turkish President Erdoğan was in charge back then too, but his reputation and behavior were very different. Turkish scientists were well-funded and traveled widely; Turkey had a good neighbor policy with Syria; Erdoğan sought peace with Kurds.

Turkey’s banking sector contracted little during the 2008 financial crisis, setting it apart from the U.S. and Europe. After a decade of strong economic growth, the Turkish government was confident. They challenged the U.S. on breaching the Gaza siege for humanitarian purposes, but maintained solid military agreements for U.S. troops.

Meanwhile Turkey’s great rival, Greece, was reeling. It became Europe’s poster child of excess debt, as its government was weakened by turnover. This upended the post World War II stereotype, where Greece resisted communism, survived dictatorship, and became a democracy, while Turkey lagged behind. Greece’s economy grew and it joined the EU. Turkey didn’t. But in 2008 they were changing places.

Obama himself recognized Turkey’s new status. He visited it on his first foreign trip, pointing out it’s unique role as a thriving Muslim democracy. Today that sounds naive, but it wasn’t then. When military leaders openly opposed Erdoğan’s election in 2008, his prosecutors quietly began their purge. A big case against military, intelligence, and civilian officials, along with scientists, business people, and journalists, alleged their participation in a “deep state” to depose him. It gradually unfolded over 5 years, and destroyed many of Erdoğan’s political opponents. By 2013 Erdoğan was enthusiastically consolidating his authority. Then in 2016 members of Turkey’s military tried, and failed, to carry out a coup d’état. That let Erdoğan’s team purge many thousands of suspected opponents.

But in 2008 conditions were different. The Obama administration considered Turkey a moderating force, that could help push Palestinian compromise. A two-state solution was considered possible, with the right approach.

I took a benign view of Turkey in 2008, but considered the Obama peace approach naive. Turkey had little reason to align with the U.S. on a Palestinian-Israeli peace plan. It would be seen as the weaker partner, even if it’s diplomats had greater influence. Further, Turkey understood that the Middle East peace process was missing a foundation to build on.

The problem with the Israel-Palestine conflict is that small steps, that slowly build support for greater ones, aren’t taken. Neither side wants to take the first step. So creative diplomacy needs to begin elsewhere.

Cyprus mirrors the Israel-Palestine situation, in much less dramatic and awful form. The island was under Ottoman control for centuries, but contained a majority Greek population. Britain took over in 1878, and discovered a quarter of the population was Turk. The UK resisted Cypriot demands to unify with Greece, partly in recognition of Turkish Cypriot hatred of the idea. Violence between Turkish and Greek, or Muslim and Christian, Cypriots became a regular part of the island’s post WW II landscape.

Cyprus gained independence in 1960, and inter-communal violence increased. The UN finally intervened, mainly to prevent massacres of Turkish Cypriots. The international community wanted the island to sort out its problems on its own, but neither Greece nor Turkey agreed. Greece wanted to annex the island. Turkey’s government was too weak to gain international support for a partition that would keep the two sides apart.

In 1967 Greece had a military coup, and in 1974 those dictators fomented a coup of Cyprus’s elected leaders. Their goal was to bring the island under full Greek authority. Turkey quickly launched an invasion, and eventually gained control of 38% of Cyprus. The Turkish success undermined Greek’s dictators, and led to their fall. 200,000 Greek Cypriots and 60,000 Turkish Cypriots lost their homes, during forced relocations.

The parallel with the Arab-Israeli conflict is clear. Two populations, distinguished by ethnicity and religion, entered a harsh, violent separation. One side, Greek Cypriots and Israeli Jews, had the upper hand. A partition caused many to lose ancestral homesteads. Both Cyprus and Palestine were under Ottoman, then British rule, and both Cyprus and Israel gained independence after WW II.

Israel’s security is guaranteed by the U.S., and the Palestinian cause has been taken up by many large Arab countries. Greece and Turkey punch much lower on the international power circuit. This is probably to the Cypriots benefit, since they can escape foreign influence more easily. Still, the outside world plays a critical role in resolving both conflicts.

The situation facing the U.S. administration in 2008 was unusual. The Cyprus government, despite being from the Greek Cypriot side, had successfully developed the island. Between 1980 and 2012, Cyprus’s life expectancy increased 5 years, years in school rose 3, and per capita GDP grew 108%. With affluence and education, public perspectives became less polarized.

The island’s partition had first been a Turkish Cypriot goal, but by 2000 it was the Greek Cypriots who opposed reunification, and Turks who supported it. In 2008 a left-wing party was elected, with a Greek Cypriot leader who wanted reunification. The strongest opposition to resolving Cyprus’s problems were now from mainland Greece itself.

Yet with Greece so weakened by the financial crisis, and Turkey so confident, conditions were ripe for a concerted diplomatic effort. Because of its Muslim versus Christian overtones, and previously intractable nature, a solution would have been an excellent small step towards Middle East peace talks.

An agreement that solidified the diplomatic constituencies of Turkey and the U.S., could have let them turn to the Israel-Palestine problem with momentum.

Confidence is key to any peace process. Confidence in the fairness of foreign powers. Confidence that agreements won’t lead to defeat. Confidence that compromise will generate compromise. Confidence that diplomacy can work.

In 2009 the U.S. administration assigned George Mitchell as special Middle East envoy, in a shuttle-diplomacy quest. Mitchell played a crucial role in the Northern Ireland peace process, which, it was hoped, would promote confidence among Middle East leaders. But politics are local, Ireland was a Christian conflict, and Mitchell a Catholic. Mitchell’s mother was from Lebanon, but that credibility wasn’t linked to his Ireland work.

In 2009 I wrote my senior Senator, Dianne Feinstein, about the Cypriot diplomatic opening. A California Senator has almost 40 million constituents, which dwarfs most other states. So I understand how difficult it can be for a California Senator’s office to digest incoming communication.

I received a response after a month, which implied that I must be of Turkish Cypriot ancestry. It was like letters sent to people of Polish extraction during the Solidarity period, or Indian immigrants during the Bangladesh war. I should understand that Senator Feinstein appreciated people of my background, and would do everything possible to protect their compatriots in the old country.

Of course I’m not Cypriot, Greek or Turkish. I’d mistakenly believed that a citizen with diplomatic insight should contact their federal representative, particularly one on the intelligence committee.

The Obama administration did not pursue Cypriot solutions.

So I’m frustrated. You go through life, you have ideas, you reach out, and they’re swatted down like flies. I know that perseverance matters. But we have lives, and democracies work when ordinary citizens, like myself, have input. I don’t have the time to write dozens of Foggy Bottom denizens, or harass my representatives at town-halls. Perhaps a citizen of Arkansas, with 3 million people, or Arizona, with 6, would have done better.

Maybe I should have written one of their Senators, and pretended to be from their state. That’s frustrating, too.